Short answer. Yes. Article 33 of the Revised Penal Code provides that suspension from public office, profession or calling, and the exercise of the right of suffrage disqualifies the offender from holding the suspended office and from exercising the right to vote during the term of the sentence.
What the law says
The suspension from public office, profession or calling, and the exercise of the right of suffrage shall disqualify the offender from holding such office or exercising such profession or calling or right of suffrage during the term of the sentence.
Revised Penal Code, Article 33 — Effect Of Suspension Penalties. Read the full provision →
What the suspension penalty covers
Article 33 of the Revised Penal Code describes the effects of a suspension penalty when it applies to public office, profession or calling, or the right of suffrage. The provision is clear: "The suspension from public office, profession or calling, and the exercise of the right of suffrage shall disqualify the offender from holding such office or exercising such profession or calling or right of suffrage during the term of the sentence." Where the suspension includes the right of suffrage, the offender loses the right to vote for as long as the suspension runs — not permanently, but for the duration.
The suspension is time-limited
Unlike perpetual disqualification penalties, the suspension under Article 33 is confined to "the term of the sentence." Once the period of suspension is served, the disqualification ends and the offender's rights are restored. This temporal limit is important: a suspended official does not lose the right to vote forever — the loss is tied to the sentence length. After the sentence, there is no residual disqualification under this article unless another provision applies independently.
Bar on holding a similar office during suspension
Article 33 adds a specific restriction beyond the immediate office: "The person suspended from holding public office shall not hold another having similar functions during the period of his suspension." This prevents a suspended official from simply shifting to a functionally equivalent position to circumvent the penalty. If an official is suspended from one public post, taking up another office that performs the same or similar functions during the suspension period would violate this rule. The key is whether the functions are similar, not merely whether the title is different.
Suspension is a distinct penalty from disqualification
It is worth noting that suspension under Article 33 is a penalty in its own right — distinct from perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification, which are separate penalties in the Revised Penal Code. Suspension is time-limited and applies to the specific office, profession, or right named in the judgment. Its effects end when the sentence does. An offender who receives a suspension penalty does not automatically carry a lifetime ban on public service or voting — the restriction is proportionate to the penalty imposed and terminates when that penalty is complete.