Short answer. Yes. Rule 130, Section 15 presumes terms are used in their primary and general meaning, but allows evidence to show they have a local, technical, or otherwise peculiar signification and were so used and understood in that particular instance — in which case the agreement is construed accordingly.
What the law says
The terms of a writing are presumed to have been used in their primary and general acceptation, but evidence is admissible to show that they have a local, technical, or otherwise peculiar signification, and were so used and understood in the particular instance, in which case the agreement must be construed accordingly.
Rule 130, Section 15 — Peculiar signification of terms. Read the full provision →
The starting presumption
Section 15 begins with a default: the terms of a writing are presumed to have been used in their primary and general acceptation — their ordinary, everyday meaning. Anyone reading the instrument without more context would naturally and reasonably start from that ordinary, everyday understanding. This starting point matters because it places the burden on the party asserting a specialized meaning to actually establish it, rather than assuming it exists from the very outset. Absent that proof, the court applies the plain, general meaning by default and the term is read the way any ordinary reader outside the trade would understand it.
Overcoming the presumption with evidence
That presumption is rebuttable. The rule allows evidence to show a term instead carries a local, technical, or otherwise peculiar signification, and that it was actually used and understood that way in the particular instance at hand — not just that such a specialized meaning exists in the abstract. Simply showing that a specialized meaning exists somewhere in general usage is not enough; the evidence must connect that meaning to how these particular parties actually used the term in this particular transaction, at this particular time, in this particular trade or locality.
The consequence once shown
If that special meaning is established, Section 15 requires the agreement to be construed accordingly — following the technical or peculiar meaning the parties actually intended, rather than the term's ordinary dictionary sense. This lets trade-specific or locality-specific usage genuinely govern how a court reads the instrument, rather than forcing every term into its plain, generic sense regardless of what the parties actually meant by it. A shipping contract using a term of art common in that particular industry, for example, would be read according to that trade meaning once properly proven, not according to how a layperson outside the trade might understand the same word. The same logic applies to farming, construction, banking, or any other trade with its own working vocabulary — what matters is proof of the shared, actual usage between these particular parties, not just that a dictionary of trade jargon happens to list the term somewhere.