Short answer. Not until the day after you receive notice that the cause of the interruption has ceased. The day the interrupting act itself occurred is excluded from the computation entirely, so it doesn't count against your remaining period either way once the clock resumes.
What the law says
Should an act be done which effectively interrupts the running of the period, the allowable period after such interruption shall start to run on the day after notice of the cessation of the cause thereof. The day of the act that caused the interruption shall be excluded in the computation of the period.
Rule 22, Section 2 — Effect of interruption. Read the full provision →
What triggers this rule
This provision applies specifically when an act is done which effectively interrupts the running of a period — meaning some particular event occurring within the case legally stops a deadline that was otherwise already running from continuing to run further, effectively pausing the clock on whatever underlying period happens to be at issue in that instance. A court order suspending proceedings, or a similar recognized interrupting circumstance, is the kind of event this rule is written to address.
When the remaining period resumes
The remaining allowable period, once such an interruption has occurred, does not simply resume automatically the moment the interrupting cause happens to end in actual fact — it shall instead start to run on the day after notice of the cessation of the cause thereof. It is specifically notice of that cessation, and not the underlying cessation itself, that actually restarts the countdown, and even then only beginning on the day that follows such notice. This distinction matters in practice: a cause may have already ceased in fact well before the party receives formal notice of that cessation, and the rule ties resumption to the later of those two moments, not the earlier one.
The excluded day
The particular day of the act that caused the interruption in the first place is separately excluded in the computation of the period altogether. That specific single day does not count against the party either as part of the original period that was already running, or as part of the resumed period afterward — it is carved out entirely from the computation on either side. This exclusion operates independently of the notice requirement described above; even if notice of cessation arrives quickly, the day the interrupting act itself occurred is still never counted toward either the original or the resumed period.
Why this two-part protection matters
Together, these two related rules meaningfully protect a party from losing valuable time to circumstances genuinely outside their own control: the interrupting day itself is excluded from the count, and the remaining period only actually starts moving again once the party has received proper notice that the interruption has truly ended, rather than the party being left to simply guess on their own when it is safe to resume acting.