Short answer. No, mild depression alone does not disqualify a person from making a valid will. Article 799 of the Civil Code sets a functional test: the testator must understand what they own, who should receive it, and what a will does. A mental condition only matters if it prevented those three things at the moment of signing.
What the law says
To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.
Civil Code, Article 799 — What 'Sound Mind' Means. Read the full provision →
The legal standard for testamentary capacity
Article 799 of the Civil Code sets a deliberately low and practical threshold. Perfect mental health is not required. The law says directly that it is not necessary that the testator's mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. What matters is whether, at the time of making the will, the testator could: (1) understand the nature of the estate they are disposing of; (2) know who the proper recipients of their generosity should be; and (3) appreciate what making a will actually does. That is the three-part test — nothing more is required.
Depression does not automatically remove capacity
Depression, even if formally diagnosed, is not the same as legal incapacity to make a will. Many people live with depression while fully understanding what they own, who they love, and what it means to execute a will. The question is not whether a condition exists, but whether it prevented the testator from meeting the three-part test at the critical moment. Mild depression that affects mood but leaves reasoning and awareness intact would not ordinarily satisfy the threshold for incapacity. A person with depression who articulates clearly why she is giving her house to one child and her savings to another is demonstrating testamentary capacity.
The timing is what matters
Article 799 anchors the inquiry to the moment of making the will. A testator who is generally ill — with depression, dementia, or any other condition — may still have capacity at a particular moment. The law recognizes lucid intervals: periods of clarity within a broader pattern of impairment. Conversely, someone generally healthy may lack capacity at the specific moment they sign if they were severely disoriented, sedated, or manipulated at that time. The diagnosis is a starting point, not an answer. Evidence of the testator's condition and behavior on the day the will was executed carries the most weight.
Protecting the will against future challenges
If your mother has depression and wants to make a valid will, there are practical steps that can reduce the risk of a challenge after she dies. A medical evaluation conducted close to the time of the will execution can document her understanding and awareness. Witnesses who observe her at the signing can attest to her lucidity. Notarial wills require two witnesses and a notary, and each can independently observe whether she appears oriented and coherent. These protections do not guarantee the will survives all challenges, but they make a strong record. Consulting a lawyer before the will is executed can help ensure the documentation is thorough.
Cases citing this provision
These Supreme Court decisions cite the provision above. We list them so you can read them yourself; the summaries of what each decided are not ours to give.
- Spouses Isidro Dulay III and Elena Dulay vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 215132, September 13, 2021 — read the decision on LawPhil →
- Antonio Baltazar, et al. vs. Lorenzo Laxa, G.R. No. 174489, April 11, 2012 — read the decision on LawPhil →
- In the Matter of the Allowance of the Will of Moises F. Banayad Apolonia Banayad Frianela vs. Servillano Banayad, Jr, G.R. No. 169700, July 30, 2009 — read the decision on LawPhil →