Short answer. Generally no. Article 2085 makes it an essential requisite of a valid pledge or mortgage that the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing given as security. If you are not the owner, you cannot validly pledge or mortgage it - though a third person may secure someone else's loan with property they themselves own.
What the law says
That the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged or mortgaged
Civil Code, Article 2085 — Essential Requisites of Pledge and Mortgage. Read the full provision →
What the law says
Third persons who are not parties to the principal obligation may secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own property.
Civil Code, Article 2085 — Essential Requisites of Pledge and Mortgage. Read the full provision →
The absolute-owner requirement
Article 2085 lists the requisites that make a pledge or mortgage valid, and one is decisive here: That the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged or mortgaged. Security law lets a creditor take the thing or have it sold if the debt is not paid, so the person offering it must actually own it — otherwise the creditor could end up selling property belonging to someone who never agreed. Ownership must exist when the pledge or mortgage is constituted. If you are only a possessor, a lessee, or a part-owner of the whole, you do not meet this requisite for property that is not truly yours.
Free disposal and legal authority
Ownership alone is not the end of it. The article also requires That the persons constituting the pledge or mortgage have the free disposal of their property, and in the absence thereof, that they be legally authorized for the purpose. Free disposal means you are not barred from encumbering the thing — it is not tied up by a legal prohibition or another person's right. If you lack free disposal, you can act only when legally authorized, such as an agent holding a proper special power or a guardian acting for a ward. Without ownership and either free disposal or authority, the security is defective from the start.
A third person may secure another's debt
The law does leave room to help someone else. The final sentence provides: Third persons who are not parties to the principal obligation may secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own property. This is the accommodation mortgagor or pledgor. You may put up your own house or land to secure a relative's or friend's loan even though you owe nothing yourself. The key words are their own property — the third person still has to own what they offer. What the law will not allow is securing a debt with property that belongs to neither the debtor nor a consenting owner.
What happens when the requisite is missing
When the pledgor or mortgagor is not the absolute owner, the security does not bind the true owner's property, and a creditor who forecloses may find the sale cannot stand against the person who really owns the thing. The requisite protects owners from having their property answer for debts they never guaranteed. It also protects you: constituting a mortgage over property you do not own can expose you to liability toward both the creditor and the real owner. If you are only a co-owner, you may generally encumber only your own undivided share, not the entire property, unless every co-owner consents.
Cases citing this provision
These Supreme Court decisions cite the provision above. We list them so you can read them yourself; the summaries of what each decided are not ours to give.
- Technology Resource Center (TRC) formerly known as Technology and Livelihood Resources Center vs. Heirs, G.R. No. 214410, August 3, 2022 — read the decision on LawPhil →
- Spouses Nilo Ramos and Eliadora Ramos vs. Raul Obispo and Far East Bank and Trust Co, G.R. No. 193804, February 27, 2013 — read the decision on LawPhil →
- Flordeliza H. Cabuhat vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al, G.R. No. 122425, September 28, 2001 — read the decision on LawPhil →
- Merlinda Plana vs. Lourdes Tan Chiua and Heirs of Ramon Chiang, G.R. No. 250636, January 10, 2023 — read the decision on LawPhil →