My principal died while I was in the middle of a task for him — must I keep going if stopping would cause harm?

The agent's basic duty to carry out the agency

Article 1884 opens with the general rule an agent operates under: the agent is bound by his acceptance to carry out the agency, and is liable for the damages which, through his non-performance, the principal may suffer. Accepting an agency is not a casual undertaking — it comes with a binding obligation to actually perform it, backed by liability if you fail to.

A duty that specifically survives the principal's death

The article then addresses exactly your situation: he must also finish the business already begun on the death of the principal, should delay entail any danger. Ordinarily, a principal's death would be a significant event affecting an agency, potentially ending the agent's authority to act at all — but this sentence carves out a specific continuing obligation, requiring the agent to finish what was already underway, precisely where stopping would create danger for someone.

The condition that triggers this duty

Notice that the obligation to keep going is tied to a specific condition: should delay entail any danger. It is not a blanket rule that every unfinished task must be completed regardless of the principal's death — the duty specifically attaches where stopping midway would create a danger that continuing the work would avoid, whether that danger is to property, to a third party's interests, or to the estate the deceased principal leaves behind.

Applying this to your situation

Because you describe stopping as something that would cause harm, your circumstances fall squarely within what Article 1884 addresses. The danger from stopping midway is exactly the condition that triggers the duty to finish the business already begun, even though your principal has died in the meantime. Rather than treating the death as automatically ending your authority to act, the article keeps that authority alive for the narrow purpose of avoiding the danger a sudden stop would create.

Cases citing this provision

These Supreme Court decisions cite the provision above. We list them so you can read them yourself; the summaries of what each decided are not ours to give.

• International Exchange Bank now Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Sps. Jerome and Quinnie Briones and John Doe, G.R. No. 205657, March 29, 2017 — read the decision on LawPhil →
• Bank of the Philippine Islands and FGU Insurance Corporation vs. Yolanda Laingo, G.R. No. 205206, March 16, 2016 — read the decision on LawPhil →