Short answer. No. Under Article 1169, once your debtor has put performance beyond his own power, demand becomes useless — and the article says a demand is not necessary in that situation for delay to exist. He is in delay without any letter from you, because nothing is left that a demand could usefully prompt.
What the law says
incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation
Civil Code, Article 1169 — Delay (Mora). Read the full provision →
What the law says
the demand by the creditor shall not be necessary in order that delay may exist
Civil Code, Article 1169 — Delay (Mora). Read the full provision →
What the law says
When demand would be useless, as when the obligor has rendered it beyond his power to perform
Civil Code, Article 1169 — Delay (Mora). Read the full provision →
What the law says
neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him
Civil Code, Article 1169 — Delay (Mora). Read the full provision →
The general rule, and its third exception
Normally, delay (mora) starts only when you demand: a debtor incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation. But Article 1169 lists situations where the demand by the creditor shall not be necessary in order that delay may exist. The third is squarely yours: When demand would be useless, as when the obligor has rendered it beyond his power to perform. If your debtor has made his own performance impossible, sending a demand would accomplish nothing, so the law dispenses with it.
What 'beyond his own power to perform' means
The exception targets the debtor's own act. It applies where he has done something that makes performance impossible for himself — for instance, selling or destroying the very thing he was bound to deliver, or otherwise disabling his own ability to comply. The key is that the impossibility is his doing, not an outside event beyond anyone's control. Because a demand to do the impossible is pointless, the article treats him as being in delay from the moment he disabled himself, not from some later letter. You do not have to perform the empty ritual of demanding what he can no longer give.
Why it matters: damages run without a letter
Delay is what makes a debtor answerable for the damages his default causes. When the useless-demand exception applies, that liability is not postponed until you write to him; it attaches from the point performance became impossible through his own act. That can matter a great deal in proving your losses and in fixing the period they cover. Still, keep your own records of what he did and when, because you may have to establish that the impossibility was real and self-inflicted — the fact that dispenses with demand is also the fact you will need to prove.
The limits of this shortcut
This exception excuses the demand; it does not excuse your own side of the bargain. In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. If you have not done what you owe, you may not be able to treat your debtor as delayed, even if he disabled his performance. Nor does the article convert impossibility into automatic damages — it fixes the timing of delay, while what you can actually recover is governed by the Code's rules on damages.
Cases citing this provision
These Supreme Court decisions cite the provision above. We list them so you can read them yourself; the summaries of what each decided are not ours to give.
- Lara’s Gifts & Decors, Inc. vs. Midtown Industrial Sales, Inc, G.R. No. 225433, August 28, 2019 — read the decision on LawPhil →
- Goldland Tower Condominium Corporation vs. Edward L. Lim and Hsieh Hsiu-Ping, G.R. No. 268143, August 12, 2024 — read the decision on LawPhil →
- Gilat Satellite Networks Ltd., vs. United Coconut Planters Bank General Insurance Co., Inc, G.R. No. 189563, April 7, 2014 — read the decision on LawPhil →
- Polo S. Panteleon vs. American Express International, Inc, G.R. No. 174269, August 25, 2010 — read the decision on LawPhil →