Short answer. Article 1138 sets a simple rule: the first day is excluded and the last day is included. So if a period starts running on a given date, you begin counting from the following day, and the period runs through and includes whatever day it would otherwise end on.
What the law says
The first day shall be excluded and the last day included.
Civil Code, Article 1138 — Computing the Period (Tacking). Read the full provision →
What the law says
The present possessor may complete the period necessary for prescription by tacking his possession to that of his grantor or predecessor in interest
Civil Code, Article 1138 — Computing the Period (Tacking). Read the full provision →
The counting rule itself
Article 1138 states the computation rule directly: the first day shall be excluded and the last day included. In practice, this means the day the triggering event happens — a demand, a dispossession, the start of possession — does not count toward the period; counting begins the next day. The period then runs all the way through its final day, and that final day counts in full rather than being cut off before it ends. Getting this exclusion-and-inclusion sequence right can matter down to a single day when a period is close to lapsing.
Why the article groups this with tacking of possession
This counting rule appears alongside two related computation rules in the same article: the present possessor may complete the period necessary for prescription by tacking his possession to that of his grantor or predecessor in interest, and continuity of possession during any intervening time is presumed absent proof to the contrary. All three rules answer the same underlying question — how much time has actually accrued — whether the issue is which calendar days count, whether an earlier possessor's time can be added to the current one's, or whether gaps in the record are assumed to be gaps in possession.
How tacking works alongside the day-counting rule
A present possessor does not have to have personally held the property for the entire period; time held by a predecessor whose rights passed to the present possessor can be added to the present possessor's own time. Once tacking applies, the same first-day-excluded, last-day-included rule still governs exactly how the combined period is measured, so the counting method does not change just because more than one person's possession is being combined into a single running total.
Why the exact count matters
Whether a claim was filed one day before or one day after a period lapsed can decide the entire case, so applying Article 1138's counting rule correctly is not a technicality to gloss over. Anyone measuring a prescription period — whether to acquire a right through possession or to determine whether a right to sue has expired — should identify the exact triggering date, exclude that date itself from the count, and then count forward to and including the day the period is due to end.
Cases citing this provision
These Supreme Court decisions cite the provision above. We list them so you can read them yourself; the summaries of what each decided are not ours to give.
- Roi Guzman David vs. Caridad D. Butay, G.R. No. 220996, April 26, 2022 — read the decision on LawPhil →
- Nenita Quality Foods Corporation vs. Crisostomo Galabo, et al, G.R. No. 174191, January 30, 2013 — read the decision on LawPhil →
- Limcoma Multi-Purpose Corp. vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 167652, July 10, 2007 — read the decision on LawPhil →
- Servando Mangahas vs. the Hon. Court of Appeals, et al, G.R. No. 95815, March 10, 1999 — read the decision on LawPhil →