Short answer. No. Under Article 1225, an obligation to give a definite thing is deemed indivisible, so your debtor cannot insist on delivering it to you piece by piece. Things that are not susceptible of partial performance are treated as indivisible, and you are entitled to complete delivery.
What the law says
obligations to give definite things and those which are not susceptible of partial performance shall be deemed to be indivisible
Civil Code, Article 1225 — Which Obligations Are Divisible or Indivisible. Read the full provision →
What the law says
the execution of a certain number of days of work, the accomplishment of work by metrical units, or analogous things which by their nature are susceptible of partial performance
Civil Code, Article 1225 — Which Obligations Are Divisible or Indivisible. Read the full provision →
What the law says
even though the object or service may be physically divisible, an obligation is indivisible if so provided by law or intended by the parties
Civil Code, Article 1225 — Which Obligations Are Divisible or Indivisible. Read the full provision →
Definite things are indivisible
Article 1225 classifies obligations as divisible or indivisible. It provides that obligations to give definite things and those which are not susceptible of partial performance shall be deemed to be indivisible. So where you are owed a specific, determinate thing, the obligation is indivisible by law. The practical effect follows from the way the Code treats indivisible obligations: the creditor cannot be compelled to receive, and the debtor cannot compel delivery of, the thing in parts. Your debtor must deliver the whole definite thing, not hand it over in installments of his own choosing.
What counts as divisible
The article draws the line by the nature of what is owed. An obligation is divisible when its object is, by nature, susceptible of partial performance — for example, the execution of a certain number of days of work, the accomplishment of work by metrical units, or analogous things which by their nature are susceptible of partial performance. A definite, determinate thing is not like that: you cannot deliver "part" of a specific car or a particular parcel of land and call it partial performance. That is why the law treats the delivery of a definite thing as an all-or-nothing, indivisible duty.
Intent and law can change the classification
Divisibility is not decided by physical nature alone. Article 1225 adds that even though the object or service may be physically divisible, an obligation is indivisible if so provided by law or intended by the parties. So parties can agree to treat even a divisible performance as a single, indivisible whole; and the law itself sometimes fixes indivisibility. The reverse is also possible — the parties may agree to accept delivery in stages. What controls is the character of the thing owed together with what the law provides and what the parties actually intended, not a mechanical test of whether the object can be split.
What this does and does not settle
Article 1225 answers the classification question — whether the obligation may be performed in parts — but it does not, by itself, excuse your debtor from delivering or fix what happens on breach. If the thing owed is a definite thing, he cannot force piecemeal delivery on you; insisting on it, or delivering only part, is not proper performance, and you may treat the obligation as unfulfilled. The article also notes that in obligations not to do, divisibility is judged by the character of the prestation in each case. For a definite thing, though, the rule is indivisibility.
Cases citing this provision
These Supreme Court decisions cite the provision above. We list them so you can read them yourself; the summaries of what each decided are not ours to give.
- Sps. Alexander and Julie Lam vs. Kodak Philippines, Ltd, G.R. No. 167615, January 11, 2016 — read the decision on LawPhil →
- United Coconut Planters Bank, Inc. vs. E. Ganzon, Inc, G.R. No. 244247, November 10, 2021 — read the decision on LawPhil →
- Archbishop Fernando R. Capalla, et al. vs. The Hon. Commission on Elections/Solidarity for Sovereignty (S4S) etc., et al. vs. Commission on Electons etc./Teofisto T. Guingona, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Tanggulang Demokrasya (Tan Dem), Inc., et al. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 201112 / G.R. No. 201121 / G.R. No. 201127 / G.R. No. 201413, October 23, 2012 — read the decision on LawPhil →