Short answer. No. Article 1210 of the Civil Code makes clear that the indivisibility of an obligation does not necessarily give rise to solidarity. Owing one thing that cannot be split does not, by itself, make each of you answerable for the whole. Solidary liability has to come from a separate source.
What the law says
The indivisibility of an obligation does not necessarily give rise to solidarity. Nor does solidarity of itself imply indivisibility.
Civil Code, Article 1210 — Indivisibility vs. Solidarity. Read the full provision →
Two different ideas people confuse
Indivisibility and solidarity sound alike but answer different questions. Indivisibility is about the thing owed — whether the object of the obligation can be performed in parts. Delivering a specific car, or building one house, cannot be done half-and-half, so the prestation is indivisible. Solidarity is about the persons — whether each debtor can be made to answer for everything and each creditor can demand everything. Article 1210 keeps these two ideas apart. The nature of what is owed is one question; who can be held to the whole is another. Confusing them is the usual mistake, and this short article exists precisely to stop that confusion.
What the article actually says
The provision has two clean statements. First, the indivisibility of an obligation does not necessarily give rise to solidarity — the fact that the thing cannot be divided does not turn ordinary co-debtors into solidary ones. Second, nor does solidarity of itself imply indivisibility — debtors can be solidary even where the thing owed (say, a sum of money) is perfectly divisible. The two attributes are independent. An obligation can be indivisible but merely joint; it can be solidary but divisible; it can be both, or neither. One does not drag the other along with it.
So where does solidarity come from?
Because indivisibility will not create it, solidary liability must have its own source. As a rule, an obligation is only solidary when the law expressly says so, when the nature of the obligation requires it, or when the parties clearly stipulate it — the default among several debtors is that the obligation is merely joint, each answerable only for his own share. So if several of you owe one indivisible thing, you are not automatically each liable for the whole in the way solidarity would mean. What indivisibility does is affect how performance and breach work: since the thing cannot be split, it must be satisfied through the act of all the debtors together.
Why the distinction matters in practice
The difference has real consequences. If the obligation is indivisible but only joint, and one debtor is ready to perform while another refuses or cannot, the collective performance fails — and the obligation generally resolves into one for damages, where each debtor's exposure is measured by his own share rather than the whole. That is very different from true solidarity, where a creditor may pursue any one debtor for everything and leave that debtor to recover contributions from the others. Whether you face the whole or only your part therefore turns on the exact source of the obligation, not on the indivisible thing alone. Anyone unsure which regime binds them should have the underlying agreement reviewed before assuming the worst.