Short answer. Yes. Article 38 says minority, insanity or imbecility, being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations. These obligations still arise from their own acts or from their property relations, such as easements.
What the law says
Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements.
Civil Code, Article 38 — Restrictions on Capacity to Act. Read the full provision →
Restriction is not exemption
Article 38 corrects a common misunderstanding: that a person with limited capacity is beyond the reach of all duties. It says these conditions, minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction, are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements. The law draws a line between juridical capacity, the fitness to be the holder of rights, which everyone has, and capacity to act, the power to bind oneself, which these conditions limit. Limiting the second does not dissolve the first.
Where the obligations come from
The article names two sources of duty that survive incapacity. The first is the person's own acts: even one who cannot make a fully binding contract can incur obligations from what they actually do, most clearly the duty to answer for damage they cause to another. The second is property relations. Owning property carries burdens regardless of the owner's capacity, and the article's own example is easements, the servitudes a piece of land owes or enjoys. A minor or an insane person who owns land is still bound by the easements that run with it. Ownership does not wait for capacity.
What the restriction does still change
None of this erases the protection the incapacity gives. The restriction on capacity to act is real: contracts entered by those without capacity are generally voidable or even void, and the law surrounds their dealings with safeguards and representatives precisely because they cannot fully bind themselves. Article 38 is not saying an insane person can be held to a contract as if nothing were wrong; it is saying the shield against contractual liability does not become a blanket immunity from every legal duty. The obligations that attach to one's acts and one's property are a different category from the consensual obligations the restriction guards against.
Why this matters in practice
For families and guardians, the lesson is that caring for an incapacitated person includes minding the duties that follow them, not just the rights. A guardian must attend to the obligations that arise from the ward's property, such as taxes, easements, and the upkeep the law imposes on owners, and be alert to liabilities springing from the ward's conduct. Treating an incapacitated relative as legally weightless can leave real obligations unanswered and property burdened. The safer view is Article 38's own: capacity to act is restricted, but the person remains a holder of rights and a bearer of the duties the law ties to acts and to property.
Cases citing this provision
These Supreme Court decisions cite the provision above. We list them so you can read them yourself; the summaries of what each decided are not ours to give.
- Eduardo B. Olaguer vs. Emilio Purugganan, Jr., et al, G.R. No. 158907, February 12, 2007 — read the decision on LawPhil →