Short answer. Yes. Article 1198 says the debtor loses every right to make use of the period when the debtor attempts to abscond. Because your debtor is trying to flee and disappear, he forfeits the benefit of the term, and you may treat the loan as immediately demandable even though its agreed date has not arrived.
What the law says
The debtor shall lose every right to make use of the period
Civil Code, Article 1198 — When the Debtor Loses the Benefit of the Period. Read the full provision →
What the law says
When the debtor attempts to abscond
Civil Code, Article 1198 — When the Debtor Loses the Benefit of the Period. Read the full provision →
The debtor's right to the deadline is not absolute
A term or period in a loan normally works in the debtor's favour: he is entitled to hold the money until the agreed date, and you cannot ordinarily force early payment. Article 1198 carves out five exceptions where The debtor shall lose every right to make use of the period. In each, the debtor has behaved in a way that destroys the trust the deadline was built on, so the law lets the creditor collect at once. The obligation, though not yet mature by its terms, becomes immediately demandable. Your concern, a debtor preparing to vanish, is one of the situations the article expressly names.
Attempting to abscond forfeits the period
The fifth ground is short and pointed: the debtor loses the period When the debtor attempts to abscond. Notice the word attempts. The law does not make you wait until the debtor has actually fled and become unreachable, because by then collecting would be far harder. It is the attempt to abscond, the move to flee and put himself beyond your reach, that triggers the loss of the term. The rationale is plain: a creditor agrees to wait on the understanding that the debtor will remain answerable when the date comes. A debtor scheming to disappear defeats that understanding, and the law refuses to let him keep the shelter of the deadline while doing so.
What counts as an attempt to abscond
Because the ground turns on the debtor's intent to flee, you should be ready to show it. Absconding means more than an ordinary change of address or a trip abroad; it suggests leaving in order to evade obligations, for instance quietly disposing of assets and preparing to relocate without a trace, or concealing his whereabouts to dodge creditors. Innocent relocation, done openly and leaving the debtor traceable and answerable, is a weaker basis. The distinction matters, because if the debtor disputes your demand, a court will look at whether the conduct genuinely shows an attempt to abscond rather than a lawful move. Gather concrete signs of the flight, not mere suspicion.
The effect, and the other grounds
When the ground applies, the consequence is immediate: the loan becomes due now, and you may demand payment and pursue collection despite the unexpired term. Acting promptly is sensible, since the whole point is to reach the debtor before he is gone. Keep in mind that this is one of five grounds in the same article; the debt also falls due early if the debtor becomes insolvent without giving security, fails to furnish promised securities, impairs the securities by his own acts, or violates an undertaking that the creditor relied on in granting the period. If more than one fits your facts, each independently supports demanding payment now.
Cases citing this provision
These Supreme Court decisions cite the provision above. We list them so you can read them yourself; the summaries of what each decided are not ours to give.
- Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Spouses Jose C. Go and Elvy T. Go, G.R. No. 175514, February 14, 2011 — read the decision on LawPhil →
- Eugene L. Lim vs. BPI Agriculture Development Bank, G.R. No. 179230, March 9, 2010 — read the decision on LawPhil →
- Siain Enterprises, Inc. vs. Cupertino Realty Corp. and Edwin R. Catacutan, G.R. No. 170782, June 22, 2009 — read the decision on LawPhil →
- Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Spouses Jesus and Anacorita Doyon, G.R. No. 167238, March 25, 2009 — read the decision on LawPhil →